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Abstract: It is a fundamental right of every natural person to control which personal information is collected, stored 
and processed by whom, for what purposes and how long. In fact, many (cloud based) services can only be 
used if the user allows them broad data collection and analysis. Often, users can only decide to either give 
their data or not to participate in communities. The refusal to provide personal data results in significant 
drawbacks for social interaction. That is why we believe that there is a need for tools to control one's own 
data in an easy and effective way as protection against economic interest of global companies and their 
cloud computing systems (as data collector from apps, mobiles and services). Especially, as nowadays 
everybody is permanently online using different services and devices, users are often lacking the means to 
effectively control the access to their private data. Therefore, we present an approach to manage and 
distribute privacy settings: PRIVACY-AVARE is intended to enable users to centrally determine their data 
protection preferences and to apply them on different devices. Thus, users gain control over their data when 
using cloud based services. In this paper, we present the main idea of PRIVACY-AVARE. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Our life is characterized by connected services and 
ubiquitous internet. Businesses are connected via the 
Cloud, citizens use available services via the global 
network. This leads to fundamental changes in 
society and business life as well as communication 
in general. Internet of things, digital social networks, 
commercial rebate systems, cloud applications and 
ubiquitous services lead to an increasing value of 
personal information. This information is collected, 
stored, used and exploited (partly without the user 
being aware of it) although European data protection 
provisions require an adequate level of transparency 
(Christl and Spiekermann, 2016, p. 121). 
Currently, many services require more privileges 
than they actually need. It is a legal obligation to 
minimize data collection, but this is not actual 
practice (Felt et al., 2011a, 2011b). Moreover, it is 
not always necessary, that users are clearly 
identifiable via IDs (for instance, in case of iOS the 
Unique Device Identifier), but many applications use 
this information and transfer it only partially 
encrypted to the respective provider (Smith, 2010). 
More problems occur, if users disclose also third 
persons' personal information (like photos or contact 
data) without their consent. This can lead to data 
protection infringement (Local Court Bad Hersfeld 
15.05.2017 - F 120/17 EASO, 2017). 
This situation shows the problems for users to 
protect their privacy, especially on different devices. 
Moreover, researchers face the so called privacy 
paradox: On the one hand users and industry often 
express their concerns on phenomena like Big Data 
or Internet of Things and the desire for enhancing 
privacy. But, on the other hand they use privacy 
infringing services without applying privacy 
protecting solutions (Vervier et al., 2017). There 
exist several approaches to explain this paradox, like 
for example the users' missing awareness of privacy 
risks due to a lack of proper information (Leibenger 
et al., 2016). Or the possible low availability of 
privacy preserving solutions and the high effort or 
expenses involved (Forum Privatheit, 2014). Also 
discussed in research are network effects that 
determine which network is used. Think for example 
about more privacy sensitive alternatives to 
 
WhatsApp like e.g. Threema. They fail to get a big 
market share as they enter the market after the big 
player (Schreiner and Hess, 2015). Taking this 
example, users can decide to either give their data to 
the service provider or not to participate in 
communities. So it is possible that the refusal to 
provide personal data results in drawbacks 
participating in digitalized social interaction. 
Therefore, it is important to help users to protect 
their personal data through user-friendly privacy 
enhancing technologies, while still allowing them to 
benefit from the full range of useful services – often 
only offered for free in “exchange” for personal 
data.  
In Europe, the upcoming General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) empowers the 
citizens' self-determination and obliges providers to 
apply privacy by design. These obligations also 
apply to international companies outside the EU, if 
they offer goods and services to people located 
within the EU or monitor their behaviour. If 
providers violate these obligations, technical control 
and enforcement mechanisms can empower users to 
claim their right to data protection. But, they need to 
be legally compliant because if users risk legal 
consequences they might feel discouraged from 
using privacy solutions. Moreover, the technology 
should be user friendly and users should be able to 
centrally define privacy settings in accordance to 
their individual preferences once, which afterwards 
are distributed and enforced on (all) devices of the 
user. Thus, in this position paper we are presenting 
such an approach: PRIVACY-AVARE 
The outline of the paper is as follows: We first 
present existing approaches for privacy 
enforcements (in section two), then we present our 
approach: PRIVACY-AVARE in section three (The 
Idea). Finally, we end the paper with a short 
summary and outlook. 
2 DATA PRIVACY 
PREFERENCES 
It is already possible to allow or deny access to 
certain categories of data on many systems. For 
example, since Android 6 it is possible to allow or 
deny apps the access to address book, calendar, 
location and sensors. But it is not possible to set fine 
granular preferences. In a typical address book for 
each contact forename, surname, birthdate, email 
address, postal address, telephone numbers, mobile 
numbers, company information and maybe role 
information are stored. For a network application 
like WhatsApp or Threema only a few of this 
information is needed, typical users need name and 
mobile number (and for Threema also mail address). 
So users need the possibility to allow apps to access 
only certain fields of each address. Additionally, the 
users want to hide selected contact information for 
example, if the relationship is socially taboo. 
Fine granular preferences also exist for other 
data categories, e.g. for the location information. 
There are some apps / services like turn-to-turn-
navigation that need the exact location. But, for 
other apps it is enough to know the position in a 
wider radius. For a weather forecast app for example 
a lower accuracy would be enough. 
We miss this functionality in existing solutions. 
Three kinds of approaches do exist from a technical 
viewpoint: 
1. Remove authorizations via the modification 
of the manifest file (e.g. Advanced Permission 
Manager)  
2. Add a security library (e.g. SRT AppGuard) 
3. Make a modification at the operating system 
level (e.g. XPrivacy) 
 
Figure 1 shows these three approaches, visualizing 
modifications of the (source) code in dark colour. 
The latter two solutions use sandboxes. A sandbox is 
referred to as environment, which restricts actions 
by an application according to defined rules (Bishop, 
2012). By an access restriction the risk of a violation 
of the defined rules is reduced (Goldberg et al., 
1996). This concept, derived from IT security, was 
adopted to data protection, e.g. by Backes et al. 
(2015). 
We have published an overview of our analysis 
on existing solutions regarding access management 
for user support (Alpers et al., 2017a), including a 
comprehensive assessment concerning usability and 
functionality aspects. In the following, we shortly 
present the main limitations of the examined existing 
solutions: 
a) Only few solutions enable the user to reveal 
just selected parts of information (e.g., 
chosen contacts (from all) or only telephone 
numbers hiding further information). 
b) Currently, only a few solutions grant the 
option to provide substitute data to ensure 
the ongoing performance of the used 
services. Existing solutions are for example 
PDroid or MoboClean (partially). 
c) Users are not supported when applying 
privacy settings. For example, very few 
solutions provide group settings. 
d) Overall, basic usability should be provided, 
however it is often overlooked in existing 
privacy solutions.  
 
e) Users need to have a relatively high level of 
technical proficiency to use the existing 
solutions, especially when using those with 
more functionalities than just blocking the 
data access. 
f) Legal compliance is often not ensured for 
existing solutions (see 3.3). 
Thus, a new, more comprehensive solution for 
privacy enforcement is needed. 
3 THE IDEA 
To empower users to decide themselves about their 
own data we suggest more privacy settings options. 
A typical user utilizes different apps (like 
WhatsApp, Threema, Maps, etc.) and services 
(routing, mail, internet, etc.) on different operating 
systems (Android, iOS, Windows, Linux) and 
devices (smartphones, tablets, notebooks, SmartTVs, 
cars, etc.). Many of these devices, systems, services 
and apps have access to stored personal information 
or the chance to collect information by sensors or 
user tracking. For every app and service, a user has 
an idea which data may be shared or collected. Even 
if every system would allow the user to control the 
access, he will not describe the preference manually 
on each system for each service or app. It should be 
possible to describe them once (for a category of 
apps and services) and enforce them on every 
device. 
The best way would be that system 
manufacturers develop a standard for fine-grained 
privacy settings and their privacy friendly 
distribution. But they seem not motivated enough to 
do so. So states (governments) or confederation of 
states should help their citizens and enforce such a 
concept by law. It remains to be seen, whether the 
concept of privacy by design and by default 
combined with the increase of sanctions by the 
upcoming GDPR will have the effect to foster such 
solutions. Until policies like this exists we want to 
help users to describe and enforce their privacy 
preferences. Based on the requirements described 
above, we have developed a concept for a distributed 
privacy management solution, named PRIVACY-
AVARE. In the following, we first refine the basic 
functional requirements and then describe a system 
concept that implements these refined 
functionalities. We also describe in more detail, how 
such a system can account for the defined 
compliance and usability requirements. 
3.1 Refined Functional Requirements 
In order to enhance privacy our software application 
PRIVACY-AVARE will have the following three 
essential functionalities: 
(1) Enter the user’s preference profile: 
PRIVACY-AVARE can be used to record the user’s 
privacy preferences. The user of PRIVACY-
AVARE is supported by suitable explanations for 
technical and legal laypersons. It creates a personal 
preference profile. Therefore, we need a user-
friendly comprehensive GUI (see section 3.5) and 
local data storage capabilities. 
(2) Distribute the user’s preference profile: The 
preference profile can be distributed via a central 
service to all devices of the user. In order to secure 
the exchange, a technical requirement is an end-to-
end encryption. Therefore, the user uses a locally 
created symmetric key to encrypt the preferences 
(e.g. using AES-256). The key is distributed to other 
devices by embedding it into a QR code, displayed 
on the first device and photographed by the second 
one. This means that the user does not have to 
entrust his preferences to a central service in plain 
 
Figure 1: Different mechanisms for right management (Alpers et al., 2017b). 
 
text; the key itself is not known to the central 
service. 
(3) Enable the user to control data access: 
PRIVACY-AVARE enables the user to allow fine-
grained data access. Therefore, PRIVACY-AVARE 
has different levels of data access control. Data 
access can be blocked or filtered. Furthermore, 
PRIVACY-AVARE provides the possibility to use 
substitute data (no data or specially generated data) 
in case the app stops working otherwise. This leads 
to the following technical requirements: 
a) PRIVACY-AVARE has to monitor data 
access requests at runtime and block data 
flows corresponding to the blockage rules 
set by the user (privacy profile). 
b) PRIVACY-AVARE has to extract data from 
resources (e.g. address book) as defined by 
filtering rules at runtime. 
c) PRIVACY-AVARE has to deliver substitute 
data to an application that would react with 
failure to a denied data access otherwise. 
Thus, PRIVACY-AVARE has to be able to 
generate plausible substitute data. 
d) PRIVACY-AVARE has to incorporate 
permission settings of existing applications. 
Those data flow filtering and blockage mechanisms 
are executed during runtime. 
3.2 System Concept 
From the refined technical requirements, we derive 
the following architecture: Figure 2 shows an 
overview of the operating principle. 
PRIVACY-AVARE is based on client server 
architecture. The server is responsible for storage 
and delivery of encrypted privacy profiles. The 
client enables the user to set his privacy preferences 
in three different levels of granularity. The privacy 
settings result in rules for data flow control. 
Furthermore, the client enforces these privacy data 
flow rules. It controls which data flows from 
hardware, sensors or other data sources to an app 
using blocking, filtering or substitute data. The 
client’s architecture is designed independently from 
specific platforms (i.e. Android, iOS, Windows). 
This facilitates the usage of PRIVACY-AVARE on 
several devices (mobiles, tablets, smart homes, cars, 
etc.) with different operating systems in various 
versions. 
 
Figure 2: Operating Principle of PRIVACY-AVARE (Alpers et al., 2017b). 
 
3.3 Compliance 
As it should not be the obligation of the user to 
decide on complex legal questions, our concept 
addresses potential legal infringements. First, the 
chosen technical solution should not interfere with 
copyrights. Computer programmes are mostly 
protected as long as the programming required an 
act of certain creativity. While the functionality of a 
programme is not protected, there is a dispute 
whether only the programme code itself or also the 
programme routine is protected under copyright law, 
so that every change of programme sequences would 
require a licence by the author or an exemption by 
law (Spindler, 2012). Regarding Android, alterations 
are permitted under the Apache licence, except 
manufacturers’ modifications. The privacy solution 
might alter such programme components, which fall 
within an open source licence, so that other 
proprietary components are just not triggered. Thus, 
this could be considered as an interference with the 
function of a programme, but not an alteration of the 
proprietary code (KG Berlin 17.03.2010 - 24 U 
117/08, 2010). Even if an infringement of code is 
inevitable, an exemption by law provides the 
possibility to alter computer programmes in order to 
achieve the intended usability, which is especially 
necessary, if flaws in the programming must be 
corrected. A “correction” of data protection 
infringements could be subsumed under this 
provision (Bodden et al., 2013), but still legal 
uncertainty remains. 
If modifications of the operating system require 
users to root their device, they face the risk of losing 
the guarantee or warranty. While warranty claims 
have to be fulfilled under the respective legal 
obligations unless the defect was the result of the 
modification, a voluntarily provided guarantee can 
be revoked in case users violate contractual 
conditions (as long as these conditions comprise no 
unreasonable disadvantage to the customer). So, 
from a user’s point of view rooting comprises 
certain drawbacks which should be avoided. 
The best solution to prevent copyright 
infringements would be to avoid permanent 
modifications of the proprietary code and to limit 
alterations of the programme routine to a minimum, 
using existing interfaces redirecting communication 
between app and operating system. 
Regarding substitute data, potential legal 
infringements should be minimized by using 
escalation steps. Even if apps are provided "for 
free", users enter a contractual relationship. Whether 
or not users risk to violate rights of their contractual 
partners when they provide wrong information, 
depends on the individual case. A “right to lie” 
might apply in case of data protection infringements, 
but a privacy solution should not require the user to 
evaluate the legality of data collection as this would 
require certain legal skills. Thus, the solution should 
minimize implications by design choices. Only if the 
blocking of data access leads to a loss in the 
functionality of the app, empty data is provided (like 
an empty address book and calendar, no sound, etc.), 
so that the opponent cannot learn anything (wrong) 
from such data. If the app detects this protective 
measure, substitute data consisting of publicly 
available information is provided, in order to reveal 
no personal information about the user or third users 
and meanwhile reduce potential damages due to 
false data. Substitute data could be e.g. public 
holidays (calendar), public authorities / companies 
(address book), background noise (microphone), 
image noise (camera). Special cases are location 
data and IDs, as providing false location data could 
also lead to negative consequences for other users, 
e.g. when data is used by the app provider for traffic 
jam prediction. To solve this, we propose a solution 
that does not provide false location data, but blurred 
substitute locations. These substitute locations are 
randomly selected within a given radius. This radius 
can then be given to the app provider as a 
corresponding uncertainty. The app provider will 
only receive the substitute location and uncertainty 
information - information that is not false, but 
blurred. 
3.4 Categorization 
As Kelley et al. (2012) have shown, smartphone 
users have difficulties to understand the implications 
of their privacy settings. The goal of PRIVACY-
AVARE is therefore to reduce the complexity of 
privacy decisions. We propose a categorization of 
apps with similar profile of privacy settings based on 
expert judgements. For example, one category 
consists of applications providing navigation 
functionality. Apps within the category navigation 
need the location of the user, but can generally be 
restricted, say, when accessing other sensor data. 
Apps can be sorted within these predefined 
categories, reducing the cognitive load for the user. 
This way, the user does not need to make a decision 
for every single app and every single privacy setting. 
The predefined categorization can also be supported 
by explanatory text to teach the user about sensible 
settings regarding possible privacy risks. To provide 
the necessary flexibility for apps that do not fit 
within one category, the user still has the possibility 
to overwrite specific settings for one app or to create 
custom categories. 
 
3.5 UI Prototype 
We have developed an early UI prototype to 
illustrate our idea. Initially, the user is shown a list 
of predefined app-categories, as explained above. 
Figure 3 shows exemplary screenshots of the 
available settings within one category. On the left 
side, the user has selected the app-category “Social 
Networks and Communication” (containing Apps 
like, for example, Facebook or WhatsApp). The 
currently selected tab lists all available privacy 
settings, like access to personal files, location, 
sensors, contacts, and so on. Another tab “Apps” 
allows adding and removing apps from the category, 
which is not shown here. 
The screenshot on the right in Figure 3 shows an 
example, how the user could manipulate the settings 
for contacts within one app-category (similar 
possibilities are available for the other privacy 
settings). The user may choose to block access to 
contacts altogether, or to provide substitute date, in 
case the app does not work without access to 
contacts. As explained in section 3.3, this could be 
addresses of public authorities or companies. The 
user may also choose to filter data access. In this 
example, the user decides to share the contact data 
of “Gunther Schiefer” and “Stefanie Betz”, but to 
hide the contact data of “Max Mustermann” and 
“Martina Musterfrau”. These settings are then 
applied to all apps within the category “Social 
Networks and Communication”. Additionally, there 
is the possibility for the user to create custom 
categories or to override the settings for one app 
within a category (not shown in the screenshots). 
4 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
In this position paper, we presented an approach 
(PRIVACY-AVARE) to empower the privacy 
enforcements of citizens. The approach is based on 
an analysis of existing solutions for privacy 
enhancement and the main functional requirements 
are presented. We presented the general operating 
 
Figure 3: Screenshots of UI Prototype. 
 
principle of PRIVACY-AVARE and discussed some 
non-functional compliance and usability 
requirements. PRIVACY-AVARE enables users to 
gain control over their data and thus enhances 
confidence in cloud based services. 
Currently, we are implementing our approach 
(for Android devices) with a focus on privacy 
enforcement for German citizens. The code is Open 
Source (Apache 2.0) and available on GitHub1. 
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